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Article 
Corporate Governance in an Age of 
Separation of Ownership from Ownership  
Usha Rodrigues† 
  INTRODUCTION   
The financial crisis of 2008 spurred far-reaching govern-
ment responses in the form of federal regulation: the imme-
diate “bailout” legislation1 and the later Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).2 
These initiatives shape in profound ways the capital structure 
of financial institutions and the vibrancy of the global economy. 
But what has been the impact on the mechanisms of corporate 
governance? Congressional responses to the crisis sound in fa-
miliar keys, because they call for increased disclosure, greater 
independence of board members, more say-on-pay, and proxy 
access for shareholders.3 To this point, however, Congress has 
failed to address a fundamental tension in modern corporate 
stock ownership: the increasing use by long-term investors of 
short-termist intermediaries (mainly mutual funds and hedge 
funds), despite an inherent mismatch in their respective time 
horizons.  
Dodd-Frank and its bailout antecedents invoke remedies 
that shareholder activists have developed over the past twenty 
years to prod boards of directors of corporations whose share 
prices underperform the market in the short term.4 My thesis is 
that the use of these remedies in an effort to enhance long-term 
 
†  Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. The 
author would like to thank Iman Anabtawi, Robert P. Bartlett III, Dan Coe-
nen, Erik Gerding, Jeffrey Lipshaw, Brett McDonnell, Larry E. Ribstein, D. 
Gordon Smith, and Leo E. Strine, Jr. for their helpful comments. Karim Jetha, 
Meredith Lee, and Carl Rhodes provided valuable research assistance. Copy-
right © 2011 by Usha Rodrigues. 
 1. See infra notes 91–93. 
 2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 3. See infra Part II.A. 
 4. See infra Part II.A. 
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decisionmaking for individual companies is misguided and 
counterproductive.5  
Central to the post-crisis law of corporate governance are 
reforms based on two key premises. The first premise is that 
the financial crisis was the result of systemic risk, which in 
turn arose from companies’ failure sufficiently to internalize 
the long-term dangers of their conduct to both themselves and 
the larger economy.6 The second premise is that increased 
shareholder involvement will ameliorate this pernicious short-
termism.7 By short-termism, I mean the taking of actions that 
result in a short-term gain, but which sacrifice the long-term 
benefit of the firm to a suboptimal degree. 
This Article focuses primarily on the flaws inherent in the 
second premise of Congress’s bailout reforms. In particular, I 
suggest that the government’s reform tactic of shareholder em-
powerment ignores the fact that the immediate shareholders of 
the vast majority of publicly traded corporations have short-
term investment horizons that can be measured in months, or 
even days.8 Each regulatory measure fails to take account of 
the short-termist shareholder problem. Expanding the choices 
of a myopic shareholder electorate to include shareholder nom-
 
 5. To situate my argument within the literature, others have also criti-
cized shareholder empowerment as an effective reform measure. See generally 
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Di-
rector Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 
(2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempow-
erment]; William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Share-
holder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010); Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & 
Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05-20, 2005) [hereinafter Bainbridge, 
Shareholder Activism and Institutional Investors], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=796227.  
 6. See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.  
 8. This is not to mention the even shorter time horizons of flash traders, 
who precipitated the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010. Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC 
Launches Inquiry into Market’s Flash Crash, WASH. POST, May 21, 2010, at 
A14, available at 2010 WLNR 10488275. Flash traders seek to exploit minimal 
price differentials and hold shares for only minutes or seconds. See, e.g., Jenny 
Anderson, S.E.C. Moves to Ban Edge Held by Fast Traders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
18, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 18348003 (“[T]he average [flash] 
trade is executed, or completed, in less than 10 milliseconds and often as fast 
as 5 milliseconds.”). This Article will ignore flash trading on the theory that 
these traders, indifferent to corporate governance concerns, generate trading 
volume without affecting corporate policies.  
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inees will not make short sighted shareholder voters focus on 
the long term. If they vote, they will simply pick similarly 
short-termist directors. Worse still, empowering short-term in-
vestors to vote on executive pay might well have the perverse 
effect of creating an incentive structure that encourages short-
term risk. Disclosure as reform, while politically expedient, re-
lies on the market processing the information being disclosed 
and pricing securities accordingly—a supposition called into se-
rious question by recent empirical studies.9 More generally, 
these empirical studies raise questions about the efficacy of 
what has become the standard toolkit of shareholder activists 
when ownership is no longer simply separate from control, but 
also from ownership—that is, when the ultimate beneficial 
owners of corporations do not themselves own shares in any 
real sense, but instead rely on institutional fund managers and 
other intermediaries. 
Faced with these difficulties, Congress should contemplate 
a very different approach to reform. Shareholder empowerment 
is likely an imperfect tool to address systemic risk, given the 
collective action problem, complacency, and other limitations.10 
That said, the most promising shareholder empowerment 
reform strategy involves aligning the interests of long-term in-
vestors and those of the funds through which they invest. Un-
fortunately, current regulation permits and even encourages 
short-termism on the part of the managers of these interme-
diary funds.11 Even those funds with the longest of time hori-
zons—including so-called target-date funds—operate in a man-
ner that subordinates the interests of investors to those of the 
funds themselves.12 Disclosure, the SEC’s proposed regulatory 
fix, fails to address the problem with target-date funds because 
investors in these funds are, by definition, not likely to be ac-
tive monitors.  
This Article accepts three propositions that others have 
questioned. First, it views Congress’s legislation in this area as, 
 
 9. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
 10. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2011) (manuscript at 31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1670017 (discussing the complacency problem). 
 11. See, e.g., infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
 12. Cf. Leslie Wayne, A Bead on Ordinary Investors, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR 12109242 (illustrating the enormous 
risks to investors). 
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at least primarily, a sincere effort to deal with short-termism.13 
One could view these reforms instead as the product of political 
logrolling. From this perspective, the reforms were never in-
tended to address the causes of the financial crisis, but were 
merely a sop to corporate governance activists,14 creating a 
dangerous placebo effect pursuant to which cosmetic govern-
ance changes would lull the public into thinking substantive 
reform had occurred.15 A less cynical view holds that, if the 
public truly believes that the reforms have created a safer, less 
fraudulent, or more favorable investing climate (that is, if so-
ciety swallows the placebo), then the reforms will be effective at 
reassuring investors and have the positive effect of stabilizing 
the economy. If this reassurance is ultimately misplaced, how-
ever, investors are merely duped into feeling an unwarranted 
sense of security in the market. Whether one takes a sincere or 
cynical view of the bailout’s corporate governance provisions, 
this Article argues that their failure to address the new stock-
holding landscape, while purporting to address managerial 
short-termism, is a problem that corporate scholars should take 
seriously. 
This Article also embraces a second proposition that some 
scholars have questioned—namely, that long-term investors 
are deserving of heightened protection.16 One can object to this 
outlook on the ground that the long-term investor is already 
adequately protected. Why? Because the long-term investor is, 
after all, an investor. She is taking a risk in the hope of higher 
return and, in an efficient market, long-term investors are 
compensated for running risks, including systemic risk, by re-
ceiving a higher rate of return.17 In response, I posit that the 
market in which long-term investors operate is not completely 
efficient: the “true” value of shares does not always equal stock 
price because of the informational asymmetries that exist be-
 
 13. See infra Part II.B. 
 14. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Govern-
ance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1802, 1818–19 (2011). 
 15. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipu-
lating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 65–66 (2006) (explaining the 
placebo effect of law as objectively impacting behavior and resulting from law’s 
manipulation of subjective perception).  
 16. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The ‘Innocent Shareholder’: An Essay on Com-
pensation and Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
243, 246 (stating that long-term investors are “most in need of protection”). 
 17. Thanks to Larry Ribstein for raising this objection. 
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tween managers and public investors.18 In other words, I as-
sume that at least sometimes market prices reflect short-term 
interests, rather than the long-term value of the firm, and that 
the market does not fully price in systemic risk.  
In addition, one may question whether long-term investors 
exist at all today—if they ever did. The individuals we think of 
as long-term investors—those saving for retirement or their 
children’s college education—might be more properly seen as 
short-term investors with long-term interests. Such investors, 
so the argument goes, will be indifferent as to how that long-
term goal is achieved; they may, indeed, prefer a series of 
short-term investments that cumulatively result in a bigger 
payoff than investments that are held for a period of many 
years. If this suggestion is true, then focusing on the long-term 
investor’s interests will not help the situation.  
Even if we believe that no long-term investors exist, how-
ever, we still face a problem. It is in everyone’s best interest for 
firms to be run for the long term. Stable firms create stable 
employment, wealth, and goodwill that short-lived companies 
cannot provide. The question our society faces is how to en-
courage long-lived firms when individual players, including 
even long-horizoned investors, may be looking for a quick 
payoff. While aligning the incentives of fund managers with 
those of long-term investors remains the best alternative to 
substantive government regulation, the efficacy or validity of 
focusing on them remains in doubt. Shareholder empowerment 
simply may not be an adequate tool for addressing systemic 
risk. My core point is simply to offer a critique: the bailout’s 
shareholder empowerment regulatory fixes are internally inco-
herent because they fail to address the short-termist realities of 
shareholder ownership today. 
I.  THE NEW SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP FROM 
OWNERSHIP   
The idea that shareholder empowerment will address man-
agerial short-termism grounds itself in the Berle-Means vision 
of the public corporation, first articulated in 1932,19 that has 
shaped corporate law for decades. In The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means pit the 
 
 18. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 698–703. 
 19. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1968) (1932). 
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interests of the dispersed shareholder-owners of a public corpo-
ration against interests of the managers of the corporations 
they own.20 The tale is one of disenfranchisement and loss of 
control: because of their dispersal, shareholders are powerless 
to discipline management.21  
In the Berle-Means world, vertical agency costs are the 
chief corporate concern.22 Managers can rent-seek unfettered 
by any meaningful shareholder control. Corporate reforms such 
as proxy access and say-on-pay attempt to mitigate these ver-
tical agency costs by providing shareholders a voice to check 
management’s excesses.23 Disclosure rules seek to reinforce the 
power of shareholders, on the theory that some subset of moti-
vated owners, proto-owners, or short-sellers will vigilantly 
monitor all available information about the corporation and 
buy or sell accordingly.24 The corporate governance provisions 
of the bailout legislation, then, faithfully follows the Berle-
Means shareholder-versus-manager script, according to the 
 
 20. See generally id. 
 21. Alternative models to the Berle-Means corporation have arisen, such 
as Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s framework. Fama and Jensen view the 
corporation as a contract rather than property. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael 
C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 302 
(1983) (“An organization is the nexus of contracts . . . among owners of the fac-
tors of production and customers.” (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976))). Shareholders contract for the re-
sidual claim, decision rights are generally allocated to management, and the 
outside board provides a monitoring role. Id. at 311–15. Importantly, however, 
under the Fama-Jensen model, shareholders reserve the right to vote on im-
portant matters as a way to constrain managerial agency costs. Id. at 313. In 
this world, shareholders share a single motivation: maximizing the value of 
their residual claim. A conflict of interest among shareholders—what I have 
termed a “separation of ownership from ownership”—thus matters even in 
Fama and Jensen’s contractarian world, given its dependence on the share-
holder vote as a corrective mechanism. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, 
at 665 (“The shareholders [in the Fama and Jensen model] emerge as owners-
in-part, bearing the residual risk and, as voters, sharing in control at a step 
removed from business decisionmaking and direct monitoring.”); Robert B. 
Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 138 
(2009) (“[T]he vote by shareholders exhibits less of the legitimizing function in 
the selection of directors than one sees in a political election of a representa-
tive, and more of the error-correcting purpose as to directors’ behavior.”). 
 22. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 19. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 24. See infra note 257 and accompanying text. 
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common presupposition that “if management [i]s the problem, 
shareholders must be the solution.”25 
This line of logic, however, must confront a troubling prac-
tical reality: the ownership landscape of American public corpo-
rations has shifted dramatically over the past seventy-five 
years. No longer do we have merely a separation of ownership 
and control; we now also have a separation of ownership from 
ownership.26 Individual long-term capital holders no longer 
hold shares of corporations directly; the direct holders of shares 
predominantly are institutional investors.27 As Jill Fisch has 
observed, “the feasibility of improving corporate decision-
making through shareholder empowerment depends critically 
on the actions and incentives of those empowered sharehold-
ers.”28 We thus must consider whether the incentives created 
for institutional investors—the “empowered shareholders” of 
today—tilt toward the short term or may be otherwise biased.  
Institutional investors come in different shapes and sizes. 
Individuals saving for retirement or their children’s educa-
tion—whose investing time horizons can be measured in dec-
ades—may hold stocks through mutual funds and pension 
funds. Wealthier investors may use hedge funds. In each case, 
the corporation’s vote holder is not the ultimate beneficial own-
er of the corporation, but instead an intermediary that enables 
 
 25. Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of 
Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 309, 335 (2011). 
 26. This resonant phrase comes from Vice Chancellor of the Delaware 
Court of Chancery Leo Strine, and this section is largely indebted to his in-
sights into the modern shift in stock ownership. See Leo E. Strine Jr., Why Ex-
cessive Risk-Taking Is Not Unexpected, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 5, 2009, 
1:30 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/dealbook-dialogue-leo-strine/ 
[hereinafter Strine, Excessive Risk-Taking].  
 27. In 2009, institutional investors owned fifty percent of total U.S. equi-
ties. Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership 
from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879 (2010) (citing BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE 
UNITED STATES (2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/ 
Current/z1.pdf). In 2007 institutional investors owned 76.4 percent of the 
largest 1000 companies. Id. at 879–80 (citing Press Release, The Conference Bd., 
U.S. Institutional Investors Boost Ownership of U.S. Corporations to New Highs 
(Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle 
.aspx?id=184326501). 
 28. Id. at 879. Fisch’s article points out the problems securities interme-
diaries pose for shareholder empowerment, although not in the specific context 
of governmental responses to the financial crisis. Id. at 879–84. 
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the investor to own an interest in a mix of shares packaged as a 
unitary investment vehicle.29  
This mediated ownership gives rise to a troubling set of 
horizontal conflicts. These conflicts exist when investors have 
conflicts of interest, not with managers, but amongst them-
selves.30 If shareholders have different interests, most notably 
divergent investment time horizons,31 then simply empowering 
investors risks advantaging one group of shareholders to the 
detriment of the rest. More fundamentally, the theory of share-
holder empowerment is that shareholders, as the residual 
claimants, will maximize long-term firm value because they are 
last in line at the time of liquidation, and thus have strong rea-
sons to guard against near-term collapse. But if some share-
holders have a short-term perspective, or have idiosyncratic 
causes to advance, then shareholder empowerment merely 
substitutes a new horizontal conflict between shareholders in 
place of the old vertical manager-shareholder conflict.32 These 
short-term shareholders may well not vote at all or may sell 
their shares to other investors if the vote is a valuable one. But 
there will be some decisions in which a short-term shareholder 
would vote, rather than sell or abstain, and where the short-
term gain comes at the expense of the corporation over time.  
This Part will survey various ways in which ownership has 
separated from ownership in modern investing. This separation 
has deep ramifications for this Article’s central thesis: share-
holder empowerment cannot solve the problem of managerial 
myopia if it is only the short-term intermediary (e.g., the mu-
tual fund, the hedge fund, or the pension fund) that is empow-
ered, and not the ultimate holder, who is investing for the long 
term. This Part concludes with the ultimate separation of own-
ership from ownership: “empty voting,” where the power to vote 
has been stripped of any connection to economic interest.33 
 
 29. Strine, Excessive Risk-Taking, supra note 26. 
 30. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 
285 (1998) (citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework 
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 591 (1992)). 
 31. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, su-
pra note 5, at 1745. 
 32. Smith, supra note 30, at 285–86. 
 33. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
  
1830 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1822 
 
A. MUTUAL FUNDS 
Mutual funds control a significant portion of the modern-
day market. In 2004, mutual funds held $4.49 trillion in assets, 
or about twenty-four percent of total U.S. stock market capital-
ization.34 In 2006, mutual funds held thirty-two percent of U.S. 
equities.35 And by year-end 2009, the U.S. mutual fund indus-
try had grown to manage $11.1 trillion in assets, making the 
U.S. mutual fund market the largest in the world.36 These 
funds are the savings vehicles of choice for most Americans, 
who seek a diversified investment that will fund retirement 
and other long-term needs—investments with decades-long 
time horizons.37 Such investors can choose between actively 
managed funds or the increasingly popular index funds,38 
which track a particular stock index such as the S&P 500. Each 
type of fund poses separate problems for reformers seeking to 
use shareholder empowerment as a way to control vertical 
agency costs.  
Actively managed mutual funds attempt to beat the mar-
ket by investing in stocks that appreciate faster than average. 
One might think that because active mutual fund managers bet 
on particular companies, they would monitor management and 
 
 34. Burton Rothberg & Steven Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New 
Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 157, 159–60 (2006). 
 35. Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question 
We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Pow-
erful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 n.31 
(2010) [hereinafter Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question] (cit-
ing Stephen J. Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role of Proxy Advisors, 82 
S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 655 (2009)). 
 36. INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 21–22 (50th ed. 
2010), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2010_factbook.pdf. The U.S. mutual 
fund market constitutes forty-eight percent of the world’s $23 trillion mutual 
fund market. Id. at 22. 
 37. Strine, Excessive Risk-Taking, supra note 26.  
 38. See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., supra note 36, at 32 (“Index mutual funds 
continued to remain popular with investors. . . . As of year-end 2009, 359 index 
funds managed total net assets of $837 billion.”); Ben Baden, Why Investors 
Are Flocking to Index Funds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 16, 2010, http:// 
money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/investing/articles/2010/03/16/why 
-investors-are-flocking-to-index-funds (“Lately, investors have voted with their 
feet and chosen indexing over actively managed funds. Huge losses in the 
stock market in 2008 prompted many investors to sell actively managed stock 
funds. During that year, investors withdrew more than $214 billion from ac-
tively managed stock funds, while stock index funds saw inflows of more than 
$47 billion, according to Morningstar. The trend continued in 2009, with in-
vestors withdrawing more than $37 billion from actively managed stock funds 
and about $36 billion flowing into stock index funds.”). 
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clamorously voice concerns about the companies within their 
portfolios. In truth, active funds are short-term investors, 
“turning over 100% or more of their portfolios each year.”39 Ad-
ditionally, they hold stock in myriad companies and therefore 
lack the incentive to expend research costs in determining 
which votes in which particular companies would most increase 
value.40 In addition, investments in mutual funds are highly 
liquid, meaning that a mutual fund investor discontented with 
a fund’s performance can withdraw her money at any time.41 
Mutual fund managers thus feel intense pressure to maximize 
short-term returns in order to attract and retain investors.42 
Fund manager compensation is tied to outperforming a particu-
lar index in a year- or quarter-long period,43 and deviations 
from that index are slight.44  
Index funds offer a low-cost alternative to actively man-
aged funds, which generally do not beat the market despite 
charging hefty management fees.45 Index funds offer the near-
automation of investing, purporting to do no more than mimic 
 
 39. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1290. 
 40. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst eds., The Harvard Law School Proxy 
Access Roundtable 31 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & 
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 661, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1539027.  
 41. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 36, at 193 (“By law, investors are able 
to redeem mutual fund shares each business day. As a result, fund shares are 
very liquid investments.”).  
 42. Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 580; Simon C.Y. Wong, Why Stewardship 
Is Proving Elusive for Institutional Investors, 25 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT’L 
BANKING & FIN. LAW 406, 406 (2010). 
 43. Fisch, supra note 27, at 882–83. 
 44. Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 40, at 39. Roundtable participant Robert 
Mendelsohn recounts a telling conversation with a mutual fund manager that 
reveals how, perversely, fund managers can actually prefer a particular portfo-
lio company to fare poorly. Id. Mendelsohn’s firm constituted one percent of 
the relevant index, and the fund manager, pessimistic about Mendelsohn’s 
company, owned 0.75 percent instead of one percent. Id. His chief mutual fund 
competitor was bullish on the stock and owned 1.25 percent. Id. “This guy was 
very candid. He said ‘I’m rooting against you, I hope your shares go down.’ I 
said that’s not good for your shareholders. And he said, ‘well, I’m in the busi-
ness of competing for assets under management with Company X. And if your 
shares go down, it’s going to hurt Company X a lot more than it’s going to hurt 
me. And that helps my business.’ Very honest. Now is that actually the kind of 
behavior we want from the people we give our pension money to?” Id. 
 45. William A. Birdthistle, Investment Indiscipline: A Behavioral Ap-
proach to Mutual Fund Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 61, 83 (“Time and 
time again, studies demonstrate that passive funds consistently outperform 
active funds in the long run.”). 
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the return of a particular stock index.46 The managers of index 
funds thus have even less incentive to monitor the elections of 
the companies whose shares their funds hold or to use their 
votes to express displeasure with management. The whole 
point of such funds is to minimize management fees by avoid-
ing the introduction of human evaluation in the selection of 
portfolio companies. The lack of human evaluation, in turn, ef-
fectively ensures the lack of any monitoring of managerial per-
formance. 
One might argue that index fund managers have an in-
creased incentive to engage in shareholder activism, since they 
are locked into a set of portfolio companies. Two problems make 
activism less likely for index funds. First, the cost of free riding 
would be huge. Take an S&P 500 index fund manager who lob-
bies for beneficial corporate governance changes at a portfolio 
company. Any upside gained from the increase would be auto-
matically shared equally with every other S&P 500 index fund 
and exchange-traded fund (ETF), despite the lack of any effort 
on the part of these competitor funds. Couple this with the 
second fact that index funds market themselves largely on their 
low fees and fidelity to the underlying index, and there is little 
incentive for an index fund manager to engage in activism of 
any kind.47 
B. HEDGE FUNDS 
Hedge funds are nonpublic entities exempt from regulation 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.48 They invest for 
the short term, sometimes turning over an entire portfolio 
three times a year.49 Although smaller players than mutual 
funds,50 hedge funds control a significant portion of the market. 
 
 46. See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, 
Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 658 (1995) (not-
ing the strategy of index funds to purchase stock of a certain index). 
 47. Wong, supra note 42, at 409. 
 48. See STAFF, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH 
OF HEDGE FUNDS 3 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/ 
hedgefunds0903.pdf (defining the term “hedge fund”). The fund must limit its 
number of owners to 100 persons, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006), or have an un-
limited number of individual investors that have at least $5 million net of debt 
in investments exclusive of the hedge fund in question. See id. § 80a-3(c)(7). 
 49. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 5, at 1290–91.  
 50. See ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 902 (8th ed. 2009) (“While mutual 
funds are still the dominant form of investing in securities markets for most 
individuals, hedge funds have enjoyed far greater growth rates in the last dec-
ade . . . .”). 
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As of June 2009 more than 8900 hedge funds held over $1.43 
trillion in assets.51  
Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock call hedge funds the “ar-
chetypal” short-term investment vehicle, observing that, “[f]or 
some funds, holding shares for a full day represents a ‘long-
term’ investment.”52 One class of hedge funds involves “activist” 
or “event driven” investors.53 These investment managers seek 
short-term payoffs such as dividend declarations, recapitaliza-
tions, sales of assets, and other actions that generate an imme-
diate payoff.54 These activist funds are the ones most likely to 
participate in say-on-pay or shareholder access proposals be-
cause they invest in order to accomplish a specific goal.55  
Hedge fund structures are, in short, shaped by a desire for 
a quick return. The lifespan of any particular hedge fund is typ-
ically short, and therefore hedge fund managers must return to 
capital markets often in search of fresh assets in which to in-
vest.56 Such a temporary focus might encourage a hedge fund to 
force a company to take actions such as selling a division or 
declaring a dividend—actions that generate a quick payout but 
harm the long-term health of the company.57  
Short-termist criticism can, it is true, be overstated. Activ-
ism focused on the short term is not necessarily a bad thing.58 
Long-term and short-term interests can be aligned in disciplin-
ing managers, forcing them to shed ill-advised acquisitions or 
 
 51. COAL. OF PRIVATE INV. COS., HEDGE FUNDS: HOW THEY SERVE 
INVESTORS IN U.S. AND GLOBAL MARKETS 3 (2009), available at http://www 
.hedgefundfacts.org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Hedge_Funds.pdf. Hedge 
fund assets were even higher in 2008, totaling $1.9 trillion. BODIE ET AL., su-
pra note 50, at 902. 
 52. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Govern-
ance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083 (2007). 
 53. This class is opposed to corporate-governance focused activist inves-
tors. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35, at 8 
n.20 (citing Charles Nathan & Parul Mehta, The Parallel Universes of Institu-
tional Investors and Institutional Voting, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. n.1 (Apr. 6, 2010, 9:01 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard 
.edu/corpgov/2010/04/06/the-parallel-universes-of-institutional-investing-and 
-institutional-voting). 
 54. Id. 
 55. There are, however, anecdotal signs of unwillingness to do so. See 
Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 40, at 25 (“[A]t a recent meeting of shareholders 
in hedge funds, the question was asked, how many in that room would use 
access? Not a single hedge fund raised his or her hand.”). 
 56. Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 580.  
 57. Id. at 581. 
 58. Kahan & Rock, supra note 52, at 1084. 
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to return excess cash to investors.59 The partnership-based gov-
ernance structure of hedge funds—which fosters close ties be-
tween firm and investor well-being, management by investors, 
and encouragement of distribution—may make these entities 
less subject to agency costs.60 Even so, some hedge fund deci-
sions inevitably will focus on the short term at the expense of 
the long term, if we assume that market price does not equate 
to long-term firm value.61  
Kahan and Rock argue these concerns are overblown be-
cause hedge funds can only affect corporate policy by gaining 
the broad support of “corporate management, independent di-
rectors, traditional institutional investors with large stakes, 
and other large shareholders.”62 Yet we have already seen that 
mutual funds, the biggest institutional investors, invest for the 
short term.63 Corporate management hardly provides a correc-
tive to investor myopia.64 As Kahan and Rock themselves ac-
knowledge, managers naturally bias toward the short term: 
chief executive officer (CEO) turnover is high, and many high-
level executives are close to retirement.65 Management’s natu-
ral desire to produce short-term returns feeds on and is rein-
forced by hedge funds’ desire to make a quick buck.66 Hedge 
fund activism, then, may sometimes cut down on vertical agen-
cy costs, but it does so by increasing horizontal conflicts, most 
notably with longer-term shareholders.  
C. LABOR UNIONS AND PENSION FUNDS 
Funds such as CalPers, CalSTERS, and the AFL-CIO 
strike terror into the hearts of firm managers. Such funds often 
agitate for reform on corporate governance matters, such as the 
elimination of classified boards and poison pills, majority vot-
ing, and proxy access.67 Labor unions and pension funds, more 
than any other intermediary investor, have the time and moti-
vation to monitor the long-term health of companies in which 
 
 59. See id. at 1088–89. 
 60. See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 289, 290–93 (2009). 
 61. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 703. 
 62. Kahan and Rock, supra note 52, at 1089. 
 63. Id. at 1083. 
 64. Id. at 1088. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1088–89. 
 67. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35, 
at 8 n.20.  
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they invest. Proudly carrying the mantle of true corporate gov-
ernance activists, they are concerned with fundamental chang-
es in corporate decisionmaking rather than the quick payouts 
that concern event-driven activists.68 
There is, however, a fly in the ointment. The difficulty is 
that labor unions and pension funds may well have interests 
that have no relation to the financial health of the company—
whether short-term or long-term—such as favoring labor-
friendly policies or seeking publicity for causes (e.g., domestic 
job creation over offshoring) that serve the ends of their own 
fund participants rather than the good of the company as a 
whole.69 For example, the pension fund for the Safeway work-
ers’ union used its position as shareholder to try to remove the 
Safeway CEO after he failed to meet union demands in collec-
tive bargaining negotiations.70 This series of events illustrates 
how a horizontal conflict can result from the divergence of the 
interests of a particular investor from the concerns of investors 
in the aggregate regardless of a difference in time horizons.71 It 
is true that these investors will need to market their initiatives 
to appeal to the broader shareholder electorate, but if that elec-
torate is largely passive, coalition building has less of a chance 
to temper the idiosyncrasies of labor unions and pension funds. 
As we will see in Part II.A.2, if reform empowers investors 
who are largely focused on the short term, two different prob-
lems can result based on whether short-term shareholders do 
or do not exercise their newfound voice. If they do not, the risk 
is that short-termist silence will accord disproportionate power 
to the idiosyncratically motivated long-term shareholders. If 
short-termists do rouse from their apathy and exercise their 
 
 68. Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to 
Make Shareholder Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REV. 41, 48–49 (1998). 
 69. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempower-
ment, supra note 5, at 1754–55 (“[U]nion and public employee pension funds, 
which generally have been the most active institutions with respect to corporate 
governance issues[,] . . . are precisely the institutions most likely to use their 
position to self-deal—that is, to . . . reap private benefits not shared with other 
investors. . . . Public employee pension funds are especially vulnerable to being 
used as a vehicle for advancing political or social goals unrelated to shareholder 
interests.”); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. 
L.J. 1259, 1271 (2009) (describing the tendency of public pension funds and oth-
er “social investors” to use shareholder power to advance idiosyncratic agendas). 
 70. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, su-
pra note 5, at 1755 n.100 (citing Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 34).  
 71. Id. at 1745. 
  
1836 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1822 
 
vote, the firm’s policies presumably will tilt even more toward 
the short term.  
D. EMPTY VOTING 
The phenomenon of empty voting provides the starkest ex-
ample of the problems that stem from relying on unfettered 
shareholder action to protect long-term shareholder interest.72 
Henry Hu and Bernard Black have identified situations in 
which investors have decoupled voting rights from economic in-
terests.73 These cases demonstrate that, at least in extreme 
cases, relying on the shareholder franchise to protect any 
shareholder economic interests—including long-term inter-
ests—can be foolhardy.74  
In one example of empty voting, Perry Corp., a hedge fund, 
owned a significant stake in King Pharmaceuticals.75 Mylan 
Laboratories agreed to buy King at a substantial premium to 
its then-current trading price.76 Mylan’s shares dropped when 
the deal was announced, and the company needed shareholder 
approval in order for the deal to go through.77 Perry then 
bought 9.9 percent of Mylan, becoming Mylan’s largest share-
holder, in order to help assure a positive shareholder vote and 
completion of the deal.78 But Perry at the same time fully 
hedged any economic risk associated with its Mylan ownership, 
so that it was protected even if the firm lost value.79 It there-
fore both held 9.9 percent voting ownership in Mylan and had 
no economic interest in Mylan. Perry thus could vote its Mylan 
 
 72. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Empty Voting and 
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 61 
BUS. LAW. 1011 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Empty Voting I ]; Henry T.C. 
Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Im-
portance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) [hereinafter Hu & 
Black, Empty Voting II ]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Hedge Funds, In-
siders, and the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Ownership: Empty Voting 
and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 343 (2007) [hereinafter 
Hu & Black, Hedge Funds]; Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote 
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
811 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying]. 
 73. Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 629.  
 74. Hu & Black, Empty Voting I, supra note 72, at 1056; Hu & Black, 
Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 655–58; Hu & Black, Hedge Funds, supra 
note 72, at 345–53; Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 854–57. 
 75. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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shares unreservedly for the acquisition, even if Mylan was 
about to pay too high a price for King. Perry would profit from 
an inflated price because of its investment in King, yet remain 
shielded from any counterbalancing loss because of its invest-
ment in Mylan.80 Hu and Black refer to this type of voting di-
vorced from economic interest as “empty voting.”81 
Some critics have questioned whether empty voting is the 
problem Hu and Black see it to be.82 The authors defend the 
importance of the phenomenon by observing that the number of 
decoupling examples has grown from twenty-one in 2006 to 
over eighty in 2008 in more than twenty countries.83 To be sure, 
this remains a small number of cases. Even if empty voting is 
only an isolated phenomenon, however, it reveals the clearest 
imaginable case of horizontal conflict, casting in sharp relief 
the danger of relying on the shareholder vote to empower 
shareholders and discipline managers.84 In some cases, a vote 
holder may have no economic interest in the firm at all.  
Not all commentators view empty voting as pernicious; 
Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein argue the benefits of emp-
ty voting—which they term “outsider trading”—on the ground 
that it encourages traders to generate and trade on socially 
productive information.85 As long as this information is not ob-
tained by fraud or misappropriation, it should be rewarded.86 
But even if empty voting is beneficial to the market overall, it 
nonetheless illustrates the problems of relying on the share-
holder franchise for the protection of shareholder interests.87  
This Part has elucidated a disconnect between the short-
term interests of intermediary corporate shareholders such as 
mutual funds and hedge funds, and the interests of long-term 
investors in these intermediaries. Even when time horizons 
 
 80. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816.  
 81. Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 629; Hu & Black, The 
New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816. 
 82. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Essential Unity of Shareholders and 
the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97, 112 (2010) (“De-
spite the scholarly jeremiads over empty voting, it has never yet altered the 
result of a shareholder vote, and problems from it are likely to remain rare or 
nonexistent.”). 
 83. Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72, at 630.  
 84. Id. at 701. 
 85. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an In-
centive Device, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 67 (2006). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See generally Hu & Black, Empty Voting II, supra note 72; Hu & 
Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 72, at 816. 
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converge, as in the case of pension funds and labor unions, the 
potential for horizontal conflict arises because of particular 
causes such funds are interested in advancing.88 Empty voting 
illustrates in the clearest way the risk of horizontal conflict 
costs by showing that the shareholder franchise does not al-
ways represent the interests of other shareholders, let alone 
the firm as a whole.89 It is not necessary, of course, that each 
type of shareholder have a long-term focus in order for the 
market to function effectively, as long as the overall governance 
system balances competing interests.90 The question is whether 
a regulatory regime strikes the right balance. Part II will con-
sider regulatory responses to the financial crisis, demonstrat-
ing the problems posed by undue reliance on shareholder em-
powerment as a cure for managerial short-termism and the 
systemic risk such reliance has engendered. 
II.  THE THEORIES BEHIND THE REGULATORY 
RESPONSES TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS   
Shortly after the financial crisis, Congress enacted the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA),91 which 
created the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP)92 to provide 
funds for failing companies. The next year it enacted the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which 
imposed rules and restrictions on recipients of TARP funds.93 
More recently, in July 2010, Congress enacted Dodd-Frank, 
which imposes new corporate governance rules on all publicly 
traded companies.94 As we will see, many themes from the bail-
out regulation reemerge in Dodd-Frank, and these themes fo-
cus on shareholder empowerment.  
The evolution from atomistic shareholding to concentrated 
institutional ownership discussed in Part I raises significant 
questions about the efficacy of the standard shareholder activ-
ism toolkit as a response to the financial crisis. This Part will 
focus on the shareholder-empowerment regulatory strategy and 
 
 88. Smith, supra note 30, at 285. 
 89. Anabtawi, supra note 5, at 580. 
 90. Kahan & Rock, supra note 52, at 1088–89.  
 91. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
 92. Id. §§ 101–136. 
 93. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
123 Stat. 115. 
 94. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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its failure to deal with the problem posed by the modern sepa-
ration of institutional ownership from beneficial ownership of 
corporate shares. 
A. ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE FIGHT AGAINST SHORT-TERMISM 
The corporate governance reforms of both the bailout legis-
lation and Dodd-Frank are concerned with self-interested man-
agerial short-termism, particularly with regard to executive 
compensation. Major corporate governance provisions of the 
bailout focused on executive compensation, due to a widespread 
perception that managers were concerned with short-term fi-
nancial results and failed to consider the long-term effects of 
their actions.95 Under key provisions of the bailout legislation, 
for example, the senior executives of TARP recipients96 could 
not receive compensation that created incentives for those offic-
ers to take “unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the 
value” of the firm.97 The law further prohibited any compensa-
tion plan that encouraged the manipulation of reported earn-
ings.98 A clawback provision required that bonuses paid to the 
twenty-five most highly compensated employees be recoverable 
if based on “materially inaccurate” financial statements or per-
formance-metric criteria.99 The concern of these clawbacks is 
that short-term managers can manipulate earnings or results, 
reap a large payout, and then lose nothing when the company 
suffers in the long term as a result of their actions. Recipients’ 
compensation committees were also required to undertake re-
views of compensation plans to guard against short-termism.100  
Dodd-Frank also requires assessments of excessive risk 
fostering in compensation:  
Not later than 9 months after the date of enactment of this title, the 
appropriate Federal regulators shall jointly prescribe regulations or 
guidelines that prohibit any types of incentive-based payment ar-
 
 95. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: 
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 360 (2009). 
 96. Defined as one of the top five most highly paid executives. American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 7001 (amending Emergency Economic Stabil-
ization Act § 111 to include § 111(a)(1)). 
 97. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(b)(3)(A)). 
 98. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(b)(3)(E)). 
 99. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(b)(3)(B)). 
 100. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(e)(1)). 
  
1840 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:1822 
 
rangement . . . that the regulators determine encourages inappro-
priate risks by covered financial institutions—(1) by providing . . . ex-
cessive compensation, fees, or benefits; or (2) that could lead to ma-
terial financial loss . . . .101 
Comparable clawbacks on bonuses also appear in Dodd-
Frank.102 The tenor of these provisions, especially when taken 
as a whole, is that managers are in it for the short term. Thus, 
we need to shift incentives to discourage schemes that encour-
age excessive risk. 
Aside from these prescriptive remedies, other reforms—
regarding say-on-pay, proxy access, and disclosure—focused on 
bringing heightened accountability to the board by way of em-
powering shareholders.103 These provisions embrace the Berle-
Means narrative of separated ownership and control.104 The 
goal of both proxy access and say-on-pay is to give a new voice 
to these disenfranchised shareholders with the hope that they 
will make boards and managers more accountable for their de-
cisions.105 Indeed, the Dodd-Frank subtitle dealing with execu-
tive compensation is called “Accountability and Executive 
Compensation.”106  
To be clear, accountability and a need for a more long-term 
perspective from managers are not synonymous. The desire for 
a say-on-pay and for proxy access are more about giving share-
holders power to voice concerns over managerial overreaching 
than addressing particular concerns related to short-
termism.107 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
explicitly draws a line between accountability and the share-
holder franchise: “A principal way that shareholders can hold 
boards accountable . . . is through the nomination and election 
of directors.”108 But a central presumption of the reform tactic 
of giving shareholders more voice to make managers more ac-
countable is that shareholders are motivated to use their voice 
 
 101. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 956(b) 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010). 
 102. Id. § 954.  
 103. Bruner, supra note 25, at 318. 
 104. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 19, at 112–16. 
 105. See Brett H. McDonnell, Setting Optimal Rules for Shareholder Proxy 
Access, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 17), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1537211. 
 106. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 951–957, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–907 (2010). 
 107. See McDonnell, supra note 105, at 17 (“The leading broad value favor-
ing proxy access is accountability.”). 
 108. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,669 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
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to further the long-term health of the corporation.109 As Part I 
showed, this presumption may not hold. We now turn to an ex-
amination of specific corporate governance provisions to ex-
amine how shareholder myopia creates problems for specific 
corporate governance reforms of the bailout. 
1. Say-on-Pay 
Concern about oversize CEO pay packages and option 
plans has increased in recent decades,110 and the options-
backdating scandal of 2006111 heightened concerns that execu-
tives were lining their pockets at the expense of sharehold-
ers.112 Not surprisingly, recent legal reforms have focused on 
shareholder control of executive compensation. Giving the 
shareholders a say on executive pay at least allows investors 
some input on the payment of managers.  
ARRA imposed a say-on-pay requirement on TARP recip-
ients,113 a regulatory measure that quickly affected corporate 
governance more broadly. On January 12, 2010, the SEC 
adopted Rule 14a-20, which requires a shareholder say-on-pay 
vote at any “annual (or special meeting in lieu of the annual) 
meeting of security holders” for all publicly held corpora-
tions.114 Following the lead of the ARRA, the say-on-pay vote is 
not binding on the board of directors, but merely advisory.115 
Executive compensation also took center stage in Dodd-Frank. 
The Act requires companies to conduct both say-on-pay116 and 
say-on-golden-parachute votes, although again these votes are 
nonbinding.117  
Say-on-pay provisions rely on shareholders processing and 
evaluating CEO pay and casting an informed vote on whether 
 
 109. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35, 
at 8–9. 
 110. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
61–79 (2004). 
 111. See generally Jesse M. Fried, Options Backdating and Its Implica-
tions, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (2008). 
 112. Id. at 880. 
 113. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3776–77, to include § 111(e)). 
 114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-20 (2010). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–905 (2010). 
 117. Id. 
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the pay package is good or bad.118 Dodd-Frank in particular 
makes the populist move of requiring public companies to dis-
close the ratio of CEO pay to median employee pay.119 But in 
light of the current investment landscape, reliance on share-
holders to check managerial greed is all but incoherent.120 
Hedge funds, mutual funds, and empty voters are unlikely to 
pay much attention to CEO compensation.121 While the manner 
of compensation and the incentives it creates might be of con-
cern, an up-or-down, after-the-fact vote on an overall compen-
sation plan does not address these worries. Because even an 
outsized pay package represents only a small portion of a public 
corporation’s expenses, executive compensation poses little 
cause for concern to a strategic investor like a hedge fund.122 
Mutual funds lack the motivation to vote at all, let alone in a 
principled way, given the relatively small position any one 
company represents in their portfolio and the funds’ high rates 
of churn.123 The votes that an empty voter is buying are not 
nonbinding votes on executive compensation, but rather votes 
on acquisitions, dividends, and the like.124 In terms of institu-
tional investors, then, we are left with pension funds and labor 
unions. Even these managers, however, may not vote against 
executive pay packages to foster long-term corporate value.125 
Instead, they are more likely to voice opposition to curry favor 
with constituents or to express a political view.126  
In short, relying on say-on-pay votes to create useful cor-
rectives to high short-term executive compensation schemes—
and the threat to long-term corporate well-being that such 
schemes entail—seems ill-conceived. Some short-term-focused 
investors will not care about the issue at all. Others will prefer 
 
 118. Id. §§ 953, 955. 
 119. Id. § 953. 
 120. Strine, Fundamental Corporate Governance Question, supra note 35, 
at 21 n.67. 
 121. Thomas & Martin, supra note 68, at 68. 
 122. Cf. Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, 
and the Partner-Manager, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281 (discussing the rela-
tionship between management pay and company income); Frank Partnoy & 
Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial Innovation 38 
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper, No. 06-21, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931254 (discussing hedge fund trading strategies). 
 123. See supra Part I.A. 
 124. See supra Part I.D. 
 125. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, su-
pra note 5, at 1754. 
 126. See supra Part I.C. 
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compensation schemes that reward a managerial short-term fo-
cus that mirrors their own. Finally, pension and union funds 
may vote, but not necessarily with an eye to the best interests 
of the firm. Shareholder empowerment as to say-on-pay thus 
provides little, if any, safeguarding of long-term corporate in-
terests. 
2. Proxy Access 
Proxy access advocates have long criticized the uncontested 
nature of the typical annual director election, in which the 
company proposes a slate and shareholders then vote for the 
management-designated directors—or, as most do, simply toss 
the ballots in the trash can.127 While insurgents have always 
been able to launch proxy contests, waging these battles is cost-
ly for the protesting shareholders, so that they are seldom un-
dertaken except in the context of takeovers.128 Outside of a hos-
tile takeover (by necessity, the preserve only of extremely 
wealthy shareholders), the most voice a discontented share-
holder can muster is purposefully not voting, or withholding 
her vote for the management slate, as a sign of displeasure. 
The idea of proxy access is to give large shareholders a chance 
to nominate their own candidates, creating a contested election 
that gives all shareholders a meaningful choice at the corporate 
ballot box.129  
While Dodd-Frank does not require the SEC to promulgate 
proxy access rules, it affirms its power to do so.130 Acting pur-
suant to this grant of authority, the SEC duly issued a final 
rule that at last made proxy access a reality on August 25, 
 
 127. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1264–67. 
 128. Id. at 1265. 
 129. Id. at 1267–68.  
 130. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). Dodd-Frank also requires na-
tional securities exchanges to prohibit broker discretionary voting, unless the 
stock’s beneficial owner specifically instructs the broker to vote, a measure 
that will remove many desultory votes for management’s slate. § 957. The 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) had earlier eliminated broker discretionary 
voting this proxy voting season. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule 
Change Relating to Broker Discretionary Voting, SEC Release No. 60215 (July 
1, 2009) [hereinafter SEC Rule 452 Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf. Discretionary voting enables brokers to vote 
on behalf of the ultimate shareholders, without receiving specific instructions 
from them. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1292. Interestingly, uncontested elec-
tions of companies regulated under the Investment Company Act are exempt, 
an important fact given the power of institutional investors like mutual funds 
and pension funds. SEC Rule 452 Release, supra. 
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2010.131 A nominating shareholder or shareholder group must 
fulfill certain requirements to be able to put forward an alter-
native director or directors.132 In particular, it must: (1) own at 
least three percent of the company’s securities entitled to be 
voted at the meeting, (2) have owned these securities contin-
uously for at least three years, and (3) maintain this ownership 
through the meeting date.133 The nominator cannot hold the se-
curities with an intent to gain control of the firm or have an 
agreement with the company regarding the nomination.134 The 
SEC rule, however, has not yet taken effect. Rather, the SEC 
has stayed its operation pending resolution of a suit filed by the 
Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce.135 
The logic of proxy access presumes that the corporation as 
a whole will benefit if shareholders have a choice among poten-
tial directors, including nominees that come from shareholders 
who are disconnected from corporate managers.136 Proxy access 
critics voice two main fears. First, the firm will suffer the ill-
effects of short-term-focused investors if the board is no longer 
insulated from proxy challenge.137 Second, shareholder nomi-
nees will be special-interest candidates, focused on idiosyncrat-
ic agendas rather than the overall good of the corporation.138 
The SEC took steps to address the first concern by imposing a 
holding period of three years on would-be director nomina-
 
 131. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 132. Id. at 56,689. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Bus. Roundtable v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
No. 10-1305 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 2010), 2010 WL 5116461. 
 136. Brief for Respondent at 25–26, Bus. Roundtable, No. 10-1305 (D.C. 
Cir. Jan. 19, 2011), 2011 WL 496545. 
 137. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rule: 
Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 379 (2010) (“[P]roxy 
access generates ‘megaphone externalities’ that are exceptionally valuable to 
labor unions and public pension funds. These megaphone externalities de-
scribe the additional publicity that accrues, at very little cost, to shareholder 
groups that run their own board nominees advocating a particular cause.”). 
However, as Lisa Fairfax points out, proxy access might actually decrease the 
power of special interest groups by broadening access to include more share-
holders. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1272. 
 138. Proxy access advocates such as Lisa Fairfax and Brett McDonnell 
counter that candidates still need to obtain the majority of the shareholder 
vote, which offers protection against the special interest danger. Fairfax, su-
pra note 69, at 1272; McDonnell, supra note 107, at 19. 
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tors.139 This requirement, however, provides only a partial solu-
tion to the problem of shareholder short-termism. The difficulty 
is that the holding-period requirement only ensures that direc-
tor nominators will be (relatively) long-term investors.140 Inves-
tors, however, now wear two hats—as both nominators and 
voters—and solving the short-term nominator problem does not 
address the short-term voter problem.141 
A key question thus presents itself: Who will vote in the 
greater number of contested board elections likely to result 
from the SEC’s new proxy access rules? Empty voters, hedge 
funds, and pension funds could all vote, and their votes would 
count all the more in light of the elimination of broker discre-
tionary voting.142 The new proxy access rules, however, forbid 
shareholders from nominating candidates if their intent is to 
gain control over the corporation, which will make hedge funds 
and empty voters less likely to nominate directors or partici-
pate in the process.143 Mutual fund managers are also unlikely 
to participate because of the diversity of their portfolios and 
their short-term focus;144 it is simply a waste of effort for man-
agers to expend energy on researching director candidates be-
cause they will likely not hold a corporation’s stock for more 
than a year.145 Because only long-term shareholders are eligible 
 
 139. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 
56,674 (Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249). 
 140. See id. For purposes of this discussion I will take as a given that three 
years constitutes a long-term investment horizon. As we have seen, in the cur-
rent investing climate, it certainly does. 
 141. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1263. 
 142. Under the former model, uncontested director elections were consid-
ered “routine,” and brokers could vote shares for management candidates 
without voting instructions from shareholders. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 
1292–93. Under the new NYSE rules, and Dodd-Frank, brokers will no longer 
be able to vote for management candidates without specific instructions from 
shareholders. Id. at 1292; see supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 143. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. at 56,675. 
 144. See, e.g., Lilian Ng et al., Do Mutual Funds Vote Responsibly? Evi-
dence from Proxy Voting 5 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://69.175.2.130/~finman/Orlando/Papers/MFVoting_Jan07.pdf (“[C]orporate 
governance experts have long questioned often conflicted voting of mutual 
funds and their failure to be vocal in cases of gross corporate mismanagement. 
Some mutual funds are suspected of not casting their votes, others are as-
sumed to blindly vote with management . . . . Moreover, mutual funds have 
historically been considered less involved in governance, compared with other 
institutions, especially pension funds. Their frequent trading due to short in-
vestment horizons, as contrasted with pension funds, has been considered part 
of the reason.”).  
 145. Id. 
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to nominate directors, presumably few short-termist candidates 
will make it to the corporate ballot.146 In short, proxy access of-
fers a choice to shareholders that many may be rationally unin-
terested in choosing. 
The rational apathy of mutual funds and hedge funds in 
director elections magnifies the second concern—the idiosyn-
cratic shareholder.147 The three percent holding requirement 
seeks to ensure substantial commitment to the firm by nomina-
tors, and proxy-access defenders can argue that any sharehold-
er-nominee still requires the buy-in of other shareholders in or-
der to succeed.148 However, combine the rational apathy 
problem with the elimination of broker discretionary voting, 
and labor unions and pension funds may well have a dispropor-
tionately large voice in any corporate vote.149  
Proxy access, then, gives long-term shareholders a voice in 
ballot composition, but does not address the question of who 
will vote. Two problems arise from this state of affairs. First, 
many intermediaries may not vote at all.150 Second, those who 
do vote may well be the most idiosyncratic of shareholders.151 
In sum, proxy access as currently implemented is unlikely to 
address the short-termist problem at all.  
B. EMPOWERING SHORT-TERM SHAREHOLDERS WILL NOT MAKE 
CORPORATIONS FOCUS ON THE LONG TERM 
The corporate governance reforms in both the bailout legis-
lation and Dodd-Frank are fundamentally concerned with com-
panies’ short-term focus. Yet the solutions they offer rely on 
empowering shareholders who, as we have seen, are them-
selves predominantly focused on the short term. The reforms 
are thus unlikely to achieve their goal. 
Before turning to this central thesis, two related argu-
ments—the first in opposition to the bailout reforms them-
selves and the second in opposition to the central thesis of this 
Article—must be acknowledged and addressed. The first is that 
the bailout reforms are ill-advised because they seek to maxim-
ize the long-term wealth of a corporation; according to some 
critics, any shareholder-focused agency model should encourage 
 
 146. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra Part I.C. 
 148. Fairfax, supra note 69, at 1268. 
 149. Id. at 1271. 
 150. Id. at 1269. 
 151. Id. at 1270–71. 
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management to maximize the corporation’s short-term stock 
price.152 This view, however, is in tension with several prin-
ciples of corporate law.153 The shareholder-wealth-maximiza-
tion norm gives managers a great deal of leeway in how they go 
about their maximizing, and the pursuit of short-term price ap-
preciation is clearly not required.154 It is true, as Jeffrey Gor-
don has pointed out, that short-term stock prices are more reli-
able today than in the past as a measure of management’s 
performance.155 But that observation is largely beside the point. 
There is ample room in the shareholder-wealth-maximization 
norm to privilege long-term over short-term wealth maximiza-
tion, as the governmental response to the bailout seeks to do. 
The second argument opposes this Article’s suggestion that 
empowering short-termist investors will not protect a corpora-
tion’s long-term interests. On this view, because present mar-
ket price merely reflects long-term value, there is no prob-
lem.156 In other words, even short-term investors have 
incentives to maximize long-term value, so that both groups’ 
incentives are aligned.157 Long-term projects, however, may re-
quire expensive investments that are difficult for the market to 
process.158 Both firm and fund managers have historically been 
compensated based on quarterly numbers, which encourages 
short-termism, earnings management,159 and, in the worst cas-
es, outright fraud.160 As William Bratton and Michael Wachter 
argue, “maximizing the corporation’s fundamental value and 
maximizing its stock price can amount to distinct objectives in 
the presence of information asymmetries.”161 Inevitably, such 
asymmetries exist between managers and public investors.162 
 
 152. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 711–12. 
 153. Id. at 658–59. 
 154. Id. at 711–12. 
 155. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United 
States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1465, 1541 (2007). 
 156. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 668. 
 157. Id.; Dent, supra note 82, at 122–23.  
 158. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 700–01. 
 159. See id. at 702.  
 160. David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly 
Earnings and What Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890, 
892–97 (2002) (discussing quarterly earnings pressures and instances of fraud 
at Enron, WorldCom, and others). 
 161. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 703. 
 162. See id. at 697. The author acknowledges that market myopia can be 
used as an excuse to shield poor managers from criticism. See Kahan & Rock, 
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What is most problematic for the bailout reforms is that 
shareholders with a predominantly short-term focus probably 
want managers to opt for a similarly short-term focus.163 Both 
groups want to maximize corporate earnings in terms meas-
ured in days, months, or quarters, rather than in years. Thus, 
for example, relying on the shareholders’ say-on-pay vote does 
not achieve the goal of ensuring that pay is in any sense fair or 
in keeping with the long-term interests of the corporation.164 
Similarly, compensation structures that encourage short-term 
gains at the cost of long-term risk might actually be attractive 
to a shareholder looking for a quick payday and early exit from 
her investment.  
This is not to say that efforts to render managers account-
able to shareholders are inevitably futile. The point instead is 
that empowering shareholders—because of their predominantly 
short-term outlook—is not well calculated to achieve the ends 
financial reform appears to have intended, particularly the end 
of reducing larger systemic risks that arise from corporate 
managers’ short-term focus.165 
The question, then, is where to go from here. Shareholder 
advocates argue that the need for some check on vertical agen-
cy costs—in the form of heightened managerial accountabili-
ty—remains.166 As Brett McDonnell succinctly puts it, “The po-
litical deck is stacked in favor of managers and boards and 
against shareholders . . . .”167 He rightly observes that corpo-
rate managers and boards are better able to organize politically 
and that states cater to them because managers choose the 
place of incorporation.168 This Article does not deny the exist-
ence of these forces and resulting vertical agency costs; it mere-
ly questions whether shareholder empowerment as currently 
conceived offers a coherent solution.  
Advocates of the status quo manager-shareholder balance 
counter that capital markets—particularly the market for cor-
porate control—provide needed correctives to managerial over-
 
supra note 52, at 1085 n.271 (collecting finance literature on the market’s al-
leged short-termism). 
 163. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 711. 
 164. Id. at 710–11. 
 165. Id. at 711. 
 166. Id. at 655. 
 167. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: 
A Review of The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 139, 188 (2009).  
 168. Id. 
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reaching.169 According to Stephen Bainbridge, for example, 
some agency costs will inevitably exist,170 but critics have 
greatly overemphasized their extent and seriousness.171 There 
are, however, significant problems with this view. To begin 
with, saying that agency costs are overemphasized is not saying 
that these costs do not exist. And, in any event, the logic of the 
bailout regulation is that managerial short-termism has 
created systemic risk by imposing negative externalities on the 
larger economy.172 On this view, market mechanisms cannot 
solve the problem; if anything, they may exacerbate it by driv-
ing managers to ever-more-risky decisions that increase share-
holder welfare in the immediate term at the expense of the 
long-term.173 Taking this concern seriously, Part III will can-
vass remaining regulatory mechanisms designed to focus man-
agers on the longer-term interests of their firms. 
III.  OTHER POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO MANAGERIAL 
SHORT-TERMISM   
As the last Part has shown, giving greater voice to myopic 
shareholders will not solve the problem of managerial short-
termism. Shareholder empowerment simply pushes agency 
costs down a level, creating horizontal conflicts as shareholder 
groups privilege idiosyncratic interests and differing time hori-
zons.174 This section surveys potential solutions to the problem 
of suboptimal managerial short-termism apart from sharehold-
er empowerment. 
 
 169. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 669; Bainbridge, Shareholder Ac-
tivism and Institutional Investors, supra note 5, at 7.  
 170. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, su-
pra note 5, at 1747.  
 171. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: 
Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 231, 232 (2008) (“[M]odern corporate governance scholarship has fo-
cused on finding a means to bridge the agency gap between diversified risk 
bearers and managers.”); Bainbridge, Shareholder Activism and Institutional 
Investors, supra note 5, at 7.  
 172. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 5, at 659. 
 173. See Fisch, supra note 27, at 882 (“Indeed, the objectives of the diversi-
fied institutional shareholder do not provide meaningful limitations on mana-
gerial risk-taking and may cause managers to take excessive risk in an effort 
to boost share price.”). 
 174. See supra Part I.C. 
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A. DISCLOSURE 
Disclosure is the hallmark reform in the American system: 
Brandeis’s sunshine175 works its magic because, when investors 
have the relevant facts, the market is able to price stocks fairly, 
at least according to a semistrong efficient capital markets hy-
pothesis.176 Unlike say-on-pay and proxy access, disclosure does 
not focus specifically on giving a voice to current sharehold-
ers.177 Instead, it is an accountability mechanism that ensures 
that the overall market—including prospective investors—have 
an accurate picture of the health of the organization.178 Aside 
from shareholder empowerment, disclosure is the chief tactic 
that financial reform legislation has embraced.179 As this sec-
tion will show, although it is politically easy to impose a disclo-
sure mandate, recent research questions whether disclosure 
alone is enough to influence investor behavior.180 Furthermore, 
disclosure of short-term incentives in executive compensation 
may only attract investors already biased to the short term 
themselves, thus undercutting the very purpose of requiring 
disclosure in the first place.  
The bailout legislation required less disclosure than Dodd-
Frank, and in the case of private firms it needed only to be 
made to the Treasury Department.181 However, in direct re-
sponse to the AIG corporate retreat scandal, the ARRA did re-
quire disclosure of company-wide policies on excessive or luxury 
 
 175. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY—AND HOW THE 
BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat’l Home Library Found. ed. 1914). 
 176. The classic explanation for the mechanism by which the market 
processes information is set forth in Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, 
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 553 (1984). 
 177. See id. at 638 (arguing that members of the professional trading com-
munity benefit most from disclosure). 
 178. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A 
Case Study of Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis 3 (U.C. 
Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 1585953, 2010), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585953 (noting that disclosure 
was expected to allow investors to analyze credit risk). 
 179. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 176, at 635 (detailing the debate over 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
 180. Bartlett, supra note 178, at 51 (showing how disclosure in a sector of 
the market did not appear to change investor behavior). 
 181. See Katie Feuer, What Dodd-Frank Means for Public Companies, 
INSIDE INVESTOR REL. (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.insideinvestorrelations.com/ 
articles/16271/dodd-frank-means-public-companies/ (describing the additional 
reporting requirements enacted in Dodd-Frank). 
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expenditures.182 Public TARP recipients were required to dis-
close narrative descriptions of compensation plans,183 and to 
provide explanations of how they did not encourage senior of-
ficers to take unnecessary and excessive risks.184 Recipients al-
so had to explain how general employee compensation plans 
limited unnecessary risks,185 and explain why these plans did 
not encourage the manipulation of reported earnings.186  
Dodd-Frank likewise requires disclosures on executive 
compensation,187 the ratio of median compensation of em-
ployees to the CEO’s annual compensation,188 employee and di-
rector hedging,189 compensation structure,190 and the reasons 
why the company has elected to combine or split the CEO and 
chairman of the board positions.191 
What could be wrong with legal mandates of this sort? Dis-
closure requirements are, after all, the easiest reform to im-
plement because they refrain from imposing any substantive 
mandate on corporations.192 One problem is that the semi-
strong efficient capital markets hypothesis argues that market 
prices take account of all publicly available information.193 
Subsequent research in behavioral finance, however, has chal-
lenged this model by questioning whether the market actually 
 
 182. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111(d), 122 Stat. 3765, 3777, such that “[t]he 
board of directors of any TARP recipient shall have in place a companywide 
policy regarding excessive or luxury expenditures,” including “entertainment 
or events; office and facility renovations; aviation or other transportation servic-
es; or other activities or events that are not reasonable expenditures for staff 
development, reasonable performance incentives, or other similar measures”). 
 183. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(b)(4)). 
 184. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(b)(3)(A)). 
 185. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(c)(2)). 
 186. Id. (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 111 to include 
§ 111(b)(3)(B), (b)(4)). 
 187. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 953(b)(1)(B), 124 Stat. 1376, 1904 (2010). 
 188. Id. § 953(b)(1)(C). 
 189. Id. § 955. 
 190. Id. § 956. 
 191. Id. § 972. 
 192. Usha Rodrigues & Mike Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Se-
curities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
 193. Lynn Stout, The Mechanics of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639 (2003). 
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does accurately reflect all publicly available information.194 Re-
cent literature has highlighted how even professional investors 
can be distracted from processing relevant public informa-
tion.195 The information’s salience appears to play a large role 
in its ability to affect the market.196 For example, when the 
scientific journal Nature published information on a potential 
cancer breakthrough for pharmaceutical company EntreMed, 
the stock appreciated significantly—by 28.4 percent.197 The in-
formation was concurrently reported in the New York Times 
and in other mainstream media, but not in headline stories.198 
Five months later, a front page New York Times article contain-
ing “virtually the same information” caused a second much 
higher, and permanent, rise in the company’s stock price.199 In 
short, “it seems that the no-new-news [front-page] Times article 
caused the stock price to more than double, on a permanent ba-
sis.”200 
A recent study by Robert Bartlett likewise casts doubt on 
the market’s ability to process low-salience information.201 
Bartlett examines the monoline insurance industry in 2008.202 
Because of European regulatory requirements, investors had 
information not only on some monoline insurers’ exposure to 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), but also on underlying 
portfolio compositions and ratings downgrades for bonds in-
cluded in them as significant investments.203 Bartlett found in-
surers’ stock prices virtually unaffected despite announcements 
of downgrades in these important underlying securities.204 
Even more interesting, a hedge fund that had been shorting 
one of the insurers failed to account for the publicly available 
information.205 A possible reason for this failure lies in the ac-
cessibility of the information. Even though the information was 
publicly available, obtaining it would have meant analyzing 
 
 194. Id. at 651–59.  
 195. Id. at 659. 
 196. Id. at 655. 
 197. Gur Huberman & Tomer Regev, Contagious Speculation and a Cure 
for Cancer: A Nonevent that Made Stock Prices Soar, 56 J. FIN. 387, 390 (2001). 
 198. The New York Times story, for example, was on page A28. Id. 
 199. Id. at 391. 
 200. Id. at 388. 
 201. Bartlett, supra note 178. 
 202. Id. at 4–5. 
 203. Id. at 5. 
 204. Id. at 6. 
 205. Id. at 39.  
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300- to 400-page prospectuses for each of 534 underlying CDOs, 
a logistical challenge apparently too great even for highly moti-
vated and sophisticated arbitrageurs.206 Bartlett’s work sug-
gests that it is not the act of disclosure, but the visibility of dis-
closure—that is, its salience—that matters most.207 Investors, 
including professionals, have only limited attention to devote to 
processing information. 
Despite this research, the regulators have continued to as-
sume that more disclosure is better than less, while giving little 
attention to the salience of required disclosures.208 In the most 
extreme case, following corporate spending scandals,209 the 
luxury expenditures section of ARRA required that the boards 
of TARP recipients adopt  
a companywide policy regarding excessive or luxury expenditures, as 
identified by the Secretary, which may include excessive expenditures 
on—(1) entertainment or events; (2) office and facility renovations; (3) 
aviation or other transportation services; or (4) other activities or 
events that are not reasonable expenditures for staff development, 
reasonable performance incentives, or other similar measures con-
ducted in the normal course of the business operations of the TARP 
recipient.210 
Treasury regulations permitted such disclosures via web-
site.211 But website disclosure is of relatively low salience, and 
therefore of little utility, to investors.212 In contrast to informa-
tion made readily available to all in centralized SEC filings, 
this information is contained on each individual company web-
 
 206. Id. at 40–41. 
 207. Id. at 49.  
 208. Id. at 51. 
 209. E.g., Peter S. Green, Merrill’s Thain Said to Pay $1.2 Million to Deco-
rator (Update 1), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg 
.com/apps/news?sid=aFcrG8er4FRw&pid=newsarchive (noting former Merrill 
Lynch & Co. CEO John Thain’s reported $1.2 million office renovations in 
January 2009); Ed Henry, Citi Says No to $45 Million Jet, CNNMONEY,  
Jan. 27, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/27/news/companies/citigroup_jet/? 
postversion=2009012716 (describing the Citigroup plane fiasco); Sean Lengell, 
AIG Execs Hold $440K Post-Bailout Retreat, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/07/aig-execs-hold-440000-post 
-bailout-retreat/?page=1 (reporting the over $440,000 AIG retreat in October 
2008). 
 210. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 
§ 7001, 123 Stat. 115, 516–20 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111, 122 Stat. 3765, 3776–77). 
 211. 31 C.F.R. § 30.12 (2010). 
 212. Cf. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 192, at 26 (describing the 
problems with Internet disclosure in the context of ethics codes). 
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site and thus must be looked up separately.213 The information 
is also transitory in nature, and subject to modification at the 
discretion of the company.214 
Cynics will point out that luxury-expenditure disclosure 
requirements were politically motivated and that no one actual-
ly expects these policies to affect the market. Fair enough. In 
fact, I will go a step further. Requiring trivial disclosures with 
little expected effect once more risks the placebo effect of regu-
lation—the illusion that regulation addresses a problem when 
it in fact does not. Furthermore, requiring additional disclosure 
risks crowding out information actually useful to the average 
investor. 
Dodd-Frank mandates disclosures to be made in proxy 
statements.215 This information is thus made more visible to 
investors. Rather than combing websites or European regulato-
ry filings, analysts merely have to read SEC filings that are 
readily accessible online.216 Still, proxies contain a great deal of 
information, and some research suggests that this disclosure is 
“noisy” and easy for investors to ignore.217 
Disclosure requirements are easy to impose, largely be-
cause they promise to thread the needle between firm autono-
my and government regulation. Although conservatives will 
gripe about the compliance costs and litigation risks imposed 
by these legal mandates, they have much to commend them. 
Instead of deciding what corporations should actually do in the 
highly politicized realm of executive compensation, corpora-
tions are merely required to disclose what they are doing.218 
Yet increased disclosure in this area seems to have led only to 
higher corporate pay packages and an increase in relatively 
 
 213. Cf. id. at 65–66 (explaining that ethics code disclosures would be easi-
er to access if it were available from a centralized SEC source). 
 214. Cf. id. (noting that website information about ethics codes is often de-
leted by companies after a year). 
 215. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 951, 124 Stat. 1376, 1899–900 (2010). 
 216. Rodrigues & Stegemoller, supra note 192, at 1. 
 217. See id. at 45 (“[P]roxy disclosure is muddled disclosure, providing 
companies with the opportunity to obscure negative information by disclosing 
it along with a plethora of other matters. If investors have a large amount of 
information to process and only limited time and attention (as they do), then 
disclosing information in a ‘noisy’ setting may distract investors from other-
wise pertinent information.” (citing DANIEL KAHNEMAN, ATTENTION AND 
EFFORT 5–11 (1973))).  
 218. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951. 
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low-salience information, with little promise of true change.219 
Particularly given the investor myopia documented in Part I, 
disclosure of pay packages that motivate managers to pursue 
short-term gain at the expense of long-term risks for the firm 
may do nothing more than increase the attractiveness of the 
firm to similarly short-term investors.  
B. INDEPENDENCE 
I have written in the past on the fetishization of independ-
ence as a governance goal.220 Here I will observe only that a 
regulatory focus on independence reflects a misplaced convic-
tion that problems often lie in hidden ties between manage-
ment and the board that result in rent-seeking. From a pro-
independence perspective, the ideal board member is defined by 
the absence of conflict rather than the presence of any affirma-
tively good quality, such as business acumen, specific industry 
knowledge, or financial sophistication. This section will discuss 
independence only briefly in part because the basic point is 
simple: while a lack of independence may have intensified the 
financial crisis, board independence was not the problem. 
Treasury regulations promulgated under EESA and ARRA 
required that TARP recipients establish compensation commit-
tees composed solely of “independent” members of the compa-
ny’s board of directors.221 Post-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), these re-
quirements already applied to most publicly traded companies 
via stock exchange rules.222 Even before the recent financial 
crisis, many large private companies had already conformed to 
this requirement, taking the precautionary approach of follow-
 
 219. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Washington’s Plans May Result in Even 
Higher Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at A15 (“The government 
also has tried to regulate executive compensation by requiring greater disclo-
sure of the details of compensation plans. Perversely, this too has contributed 
to an increase in executive pay. How so? No self-respecting board of directors 
is willing to admit that their company’s CEO is below average. So anytime the 
new disclosures indicate that an executive’s pay is below average in any way, a 
pay increase is ordered.”). 
 220. See generally Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 
J. CORP. L. 447 (2008). 
 221. 31 C.F.R. §§ 30.1–.4 (2009). 
 222. Order Approving NYSE & NASD Proposed Rule Changes Relating to 
Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,175 (Nov. 12, 2003) (approving 
NYSE Final Rule codified at NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A (2002) 
and NASD Amendments to Rules 4200 and 4350(c)). 
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ing corporate governance best practices.223 The new rules thus 
called on public companies to do what they already largely had 
done. 
Conflicts in outside rating agencies may well have exacer-
bated the financial crisis by creating seemingly independent 
evaluators that actually tailored their ratings to the needs of 
their clients, the institutions offering the securities.224 This 
was, and is, a genuine problem, which Dodd-Frank addresses 
much as SOX had previously addressed conflicts between cor-
porate managers and outside auditors.225 In contrast, within 
corporations or banks there were few allegations of boards or 
board committees having ties to executives or managers that 
skewed their compensation. Although compensation schemes 
may have been marked by flaws, those flaws seemed rarely to 
involve classic cases of conflict that an independent compensa-
tion committee seeks to avoid, such as overpaying a trader who 
was a director’s or officer’s brother or former boss, for example. 
Despite the lack of a demonstrated problem with compensation 
committee independence, the general approach of EESA and 
ARRA seems to be that independence is good, and more inde-
pendence is better. Given the preexisting prevalence of inde-
pendent compensation committees, imposing an independence 
requirement on TARP beneficiaries226 was a near-costless gov-
ernance reform.  
Dodd-Frank broadened the independent compensation 
committee requirement to include all public companies.227 It 
specified that, when promulgating rules regarding defining in-
dependence, the SEC should consider “the source of compensa-
tion . . . , including any consulting, advisory, or other compen-
satory fee” paid to the director and whether the director is 
affiliated with the issuer or a subsidiary.228 The regulatory pre-
sumption again appears to be that where there is a problem, its 
 
 223. See generally FREDERICK D. LIPMAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEST 
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 225. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
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root must lie in a hidden conflict of some kind, even though the 
existence of such conflicts was already extremely unlikely given 
the near-universality of independent compensation committees.  
The real conflict is structural. Excessive compensation is 
more likely the product of increased use of compensation con-
sultants and benchmarking against the packages offered to 
comparable executives within the same industry.229 Use of con-
sultants tends to inflate fees.230 A 2007 Corporate Library Re-
port, for example, concluded that “companies using consultants 
offer significantly higher pay than companies not using consul-
tants and that engaging the services of a compensation consul-
tant does not appear to increase the effectiveness of incentive 
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no, supra, at 260; see also Brian Cadmun et al., The Incentives of Compensa-
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plans.”231 The ramifications of increased compensation commit-
tee independence are thus relatively modest, as are the payoffs 
of this reform.232 
Popular discontent regarding high levels of executive com-
pensation undeniably exists.233 Yet the regulatory tools em-
ployed to address this concern—increased independence and 
heightened disclosure—are of little practical significance as a 
curative. Widespread use of independent compensation com-
mittees and disclosure, the main regulatory tools of the past 
two decades, have failed to solve this problem. The logical al-
ternative, both in reining in compensation and in addressing 
short-termism more generally, is the politically unpalatable 
path of substantive government regulation.  
C. SUBSTANTIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
Dodd-Frank has increased capital requirements for large 
banks.234 It also has widened the scope of regulation for non-
bank financial companies that pose risks to the country’s finan-
cial stability.235 The bailout regulations limited executive com-
pensation to $500,000 for recipient firms236 and prohibited 
golden parachutes.237 One can debate whether executive pay is 
excessive and should be regulated, but substantive regulation 
that sets clear limits—such as the European Union’s recent 
move to place ceilings on banker bonuses238—is a more coher-
ent way of holding down executive pay than offering sharehold-
ers a vote on that pay or forcing companies to disclose compari-
sons of CEO compensation to that of the rank-and-file or 
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compensation structures, or evaluating their riskiness.239 Sub-
stantive choices on pay are more politically risky than disclo-
sure because they involve backing a particular position, and po-
litical realities may preclude imposing hard compensation caps 
on CEOs.240 But pretending, in the face of the current invest-
ment landscape, that shareholder empowerment mechanisms 
like say-on-pay and increased disclosure will constrain pay is 
disingenuous.241 Short-term investors want short-term mana-
gerial incentives, and disclosure of or votes on these incentives 
will only empower shareholders to reinforce those preferences. 
D. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE INTERMEDIARY 
If a problem inheres in the disconnect between the long-
term beneficial owners of stock and the short-term vehicles 
they invest in, then a logical regulatory fix involves policing the 
intermediary. Congress considered, but ultimately declined to 
incorporate into Dodd-Frank, a fiduciary standard for broker-
dealers. Congress, however, did direct the SEC to undertake a 
study on the matter and granted the SEC discretionary author-
ity to adopt rules on the subject.242  
Vice Chancellor Leo Strine has offered a number of intri-
guing solutions, all aimed at aligning the interests of long-term 
owners and the institutional investors that manage their mon-
ey.243 Strine’s proposals include:  
1) pricing and tax strategies to encourage investing and discourage 
churning by institutional investors and “fund hopping” by end-user 
investors;  
2) enhanced requirements for institutional investors to factor con-
cern about fundamental risk, leverage, and legal compliance into 
their investing and corporate governance decisions;  
3) requirements that investment manager compensation be aligned 
with the investment horizons of end-user investors;  
4) considering a mandated separation of funds managing 401(k) and 
college savings investments from more liquid investments, and re-
quiring investing practices consistent with retirement and college in-
vestment objectives; 
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5) requirements that index funds vote shares and engage in activism 
in a manner consistent with the funds’ commitment to hold the entire 
benchmark index;  
6) leverage limitations, broader disclosure and other regulations for 
hedge funds that decrease the ability and incentive of these funds to 
effectively push public corporations into risky business decisions;  
7) mandating that institutional investors disclose fuller and more 
timely information about their economic interests (including their 
ownership of derivatives and short positions) and about their voting 
and share lending policies;  
8) restoring the sophisticated investor exception to allow[ the 
wealthy to engage in risky investments], and requiring pension, char-
itable, and governmental investment funds to only invest through in-
vestment advisors covered by the 1940 Act; and  
9) prohibiting pension, charitable, and governmental investment 
funds from relying on the advice of proxy advisory services unless 
those services give voting advice based on the economic perspective 
and goals of an investor intending to hold her stock for at least five 
years.244 
These proposals all involve changing the incentives of in-
termediaries to make them focus on the longer-term investing 
horizon of investors and, hopefully, to take more responsibility 
for the votes and choices they make as investors in public com-
panies.245 At the least, these proposals thus represent a much-
needed recognition of the short-term/long-term disconnect. This 
is not the first time institutional investors have offered a 
tempting reform target.246 The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) established a rebuttable presump-
tion that the plaintiff with the largest financial interest—
usually an institutional investor—be appointed lead plaintiff in 
a securities class action,247 relying on the “money” to do the 
monitoring.248 Subsequent evidence revealed an unwillingness 
of some institutional investors to serve249 or even to collect 
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money from class action settlements.250 The legacy of the 
PSLRA teaches us that policing would be required, either by 
investors or the government, to ensure that the new require-
ments of the Strine proposals would be met.  
Institutional investors introduce agency costs of their own, 
which undermine their ability to play an effective monitoring 
role. Mutual fund managers are rationally unwilling to invest 
resources in monitoring portfolio companies when that will in-
crease their costs. Bank trust departments have an institution-
al interest in keeping their client companies happy, as do in-
surers and mutual fund companies, which often vie for the 
pension and the defined contribution business of portfolio com-
panies.251 Strine’s suggestions begin to address these problems 
but require monitoring of their own.252 The government must 
make decisions as to which pricing and tax strategies discour-
age churn and fund hopping, ensure that institutional investors 
are focusing on “fundamental risk, leverage, and legal com-
pliance” (suggestions 1–2).253 It must also decide whether man-
ager compensation is in fact aligned with the interests of long-
term end investors (suggestion 3).254 Similarly, an agency must 
review whether retirement and college savings funds are in-
vested consistent with their objectives, that index funds engage 
in appropriate activism, and that proxy services are basing 
their advice on the perspective of a long-term investor (sugges-
tions 4–6, 9).255 Additionally, requiring disclosure presumes 
that someone—again, a government agency or investors—is 
processing the disclosed information (suggestions 6–7).256 As we 
have seen, however, the average mutual fund investor, at least, 
is unlikely to monitor such disclosures very closely.  
The solutions rely on disclosure and thus are limited to the 
extent that ultimate investors are unwilling to invest time and 
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effort in learning about the funds in which they invest.257 To 
the extent that the government provides this monitoring role, 
disclosure-based solutions will involve bureaucrats in making 
choices about appropriate risk levels—choices that inevitably 
will be criticized as unduly conservative or risky when the next 
bubble surfaces.  
E. THE MARKET? THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF TARGET-DATE 
FUNDS 
Ideally, the market would provide investment vehicles spe-
cifically designed for long-term holders.258 Indeed, one could 
point to target date funds (TDFs, also called lifecycle funds) to 
argue that it has.259 In theory, these funds ideally fit the inter-
ests of the long-term investor.260 They start out with a high lev-
el of risk (i.e., highly exposed to stock) and automatically adjust 
asset allocations over time to end at the target date (which is 
often the retirement date for the investor) with a much more 
conservative portfolio.261 This gradually shifting asset mix is 
poetically termed the fund’s “glide path.”262 The idea is that a 
forty-year-old investor starting a job in 2010 and expecting to 
retire at seventy would pick a target-date fund of 2040.263 At 
the beginning, the fund’s holdings would be mostly stocks and 
stock funds.264 It would automatically rebalance according to its 
preset glide path, so that by the target date it would hold a con-
servative mix of investments, with a strong emphasis on high-
grade bonds.265 It is, in short, the nature of target-date funds to 
focus on the long term.  
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Even so, these funds present two distinct problems. First, 
they are designed and marketed for unsophisticated or time-
pressed target-fund investors, and their purchase is often not 
even the product of conscious choice. Second, the details of tar-
get-fund implementation create a heightened risk of vertical 
agency costs. As to the first problem, TDFs are a popular 
means of implementing a “set-it-and-forget-it” style of invest-
ing, one based on behavioral economics’ insights into investor 
behavior and “nudging.”266 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 
(PPA) responded to these insights by putting in place a sign-up 
structure that simplified the process for employee enrollment 
in 401(k) plans.267 In particular, PPA requires employees who 
do not desire to save for retirement to opt out of, rather than 
opt into, 401(k)s.268 One of the permissible default choices em-
ployers can select for their employees under the Act is the tar-
get-date fund, and many employers use TDFs as their default 
investment.269 After automatic enrollment was introduced, 
“participation rates doubled and 80% of employees accept the 
default savings rate and default investment fund.”270 TDFs 
consequently have proliferated to the point that they now 
represent nearly seven percent of total 401(k) assets,271 and 
some $270 billion in assets.272 Their privileged status as default 
investment vehicles means that TDFs represent a considerable 
portion of a huge pool of investments “chosen” by retirement 
plan participants without actual thought being given to their 
merits vis-à-vis other investment vehicles. Any move to em-
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power, or even inform, these most passive of investors is there-
fore suspect.  
The second problem presented by TDFs stems from their 
“fund-of-fund” investing approach.273 Rather than investing in 
individual companies, TDF managers tend to invest in mutual 
funds, a feature that means that agency costs might be even 
more pronounced in the case of TDFs than in the typical 
fund.274 Although the academic literature on this subject is lim-
ited, one troubling study found that TDFs underperform bal-
anced funds with similar asset allocations.275 The authors of 
the study attributed this underperformance to a preference of 
the TDFs to invest in funds within their own fund families, 
thus generating a “double dip” in management fees for the 
holding company owning the related funds.276 The study con-
cluded the TDF investments enrich the overall fund company 
with high expense ratios, rather than optimally serve the inter-
ests of investors.277 
Target-date funds received congressional attention in 2009, 
when it was reported that the “average loss in thirty-one funds 
with a 2010 target date was . . . 25%.”278 One 2010 fund lost 
forty-one percent in 2008 due to heavy exposure in stocks, an 
allocation that surprised many observers given the proximity of 
the fund to its target date.279 On June 16, 2010, the SEC pro-
posed new rules on how target-date funds may be marketed in 
response to concerns that investors did not understand the 
funds and underestimated the degree of risk associated with 
the investments due in part to inadequate disclosures.280 The 
proposed rules require that if a TDF has a date in its name, it 
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must convey information about the asset allocation at that tar-
get date.281 More generally, the rules require enhanced disclo-
sure of a TDF’s glide path in its marketing materials.282 
The regulatory mismatch is clear in the SEC’s own pro-
posed rule: target-date funds have been used largely as a de-
fault for employees who do not opt out of 401(k) participa-
tion.283 These investors have not made a conscious investment 
choice, let alone seen or processed any marketing literature at 
all. Further disclosure will be lost on them. Even investors who 
consciously choose TDFs are either financially unsophisticated 
or too busy to make careful investment choices.284 More disclo-
sure to investors of this sort is unlikely to help remedy prob-
lems with target-date funds. Employers could theoretically 
serve a monitoring role, but most employers use mutual fund 
companies as investment advisors, and are steered into those 
very companies’ own TDFs.285 Similarly, disclosure cannot ad-
dress the fund-of-fund problem, since inattentive investors will 
not focus on the problems this structure poses.  
The TDF case study reveals a clear case of the dangers of 
separating ownership from ownership. Indeed, because of the 
fund-of-fund investing favored by TDFs, an employee is three 
times removed from any actual corporate profit generation be-
cause she invests in a mutual fund that invests in other mutual 
funds in a diversified portfolio.286 There is nothing to guarantee 
her that either her TDF or the funds in which it invests are 
making long-term choices in the investor’s interest.287 Instead, 
they appear to be lining their pockets with layer upon layer of 
fees.288 Worse still, in an environment in which the investor has 
not made a conscious investment choice at all, the SEC’s solu-
tion is to require more disclosure. It would be hard to find a 
better example of regulators’ failure to address the root causes 
of the problems long-term investors face in a short-termist 
world. 
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  CONCLUSION   
The underlying concern that Congress sought to address in 
Dodd-Frank is that short-termism causes systemic risk. Regu-
latory responses to the bailout have fallen back on familiar 
tools like shareholder empowerment, disclosure, and independ-
ence, with no acknowledgement that the investing landscape 
has changed in ways that make traditional regulatory ap-
proaches unlikely to advance underlying regulatory aims. This 
Article makes no attempt to offer a grand solution to the result-
ing problems. Instead, it focuses on bringing those problems in-
to clearer view. Without an understanding of the challenges 
posed by a new financial world in which ownership is separated 
from ownership, governmental reform efforts will not work and 
indeed may compound real-world difficulties. 
The conclusion may well be that there’s no such thing as a 
free lunch. Ideally, we want public corporations to be monitored 
by sophisticated long-term investors that have the motivation 
to watch closely. But rational shareholders often follow a port-
folio theory of investing that focuses on the diversification of 
assets. This style of investing negates incentives to use the 
tools of shareholder empowerment—proxy access, say-on-pay, 
even disclosure—which recent financial reform has offered. The 
better choice appears to be carefully chosen forms of substan-
tive governmental regulation—politically costly though it may 
be—or restructuring the law to realign the incentives of institu-
tional investors with those of long-term shareholders. 
